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We use data from the Canadian National Population Health Survey and
the Canadian Institute for Health Information to estimate the relation-
ship between per capita supply of physicians, both general practitioners
and specialists, on health status. Measures of quality of life, self-assessed
health status and the Health Utility Index are explored. The sample con-
sists of all individuals who were age 18 or over at the beginning of the
survey in 1994, and the sub-sample includes only individuals who were
not diagnosed with a chronic condition for the ﬁrst four years. Most
previous studies of the eﬀect of physician supply on health status used
data only on individuals who had speciﬁc health problems, and many
of them used outcomes related to the length of life of the patient. Ran-
dom eﬀects ordered probits are used to model self assessed health status
and quantile regressions are used for the Health Utility Index. A higher
supply of specialists is correlated with worse health outcomes, while a
higher supply of general practitioners is correlated with better health
outcomes as measured by both measures of health status.
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The supply of physicians across Canada and especially in remote areas has been a much
publicized issue in the health care debate. The media reports an important brain drain
towards the United States, especially for some specialties, and that remote areas have trouble
attracting physicians, again especially specialists, and convincing them to stay in the area
once they have started practicing there.
Although some areas have urgent needs for some specialties (e.g. anesthetists), not much
has been reported about how physician supply aﬀects health care supply and health status.
Not much has been reported either about which types of doctors (general practitioners vs.
specialists) aﬀect health status of individuals in general (including those who do not have a
speciﬁc health problem) with the best outcomes.
In previous work, we have found that per capita expenditures in constant dollars on
physicians who do not work in a care institution (whether a hospital or another type of in-
stitution) often have a negative relation with health status, although not always statistically
signiﬁcant. In this study, we use longitudinal data from the National Population Health Sur-
vey (NPHS) and merge them with data from the Canadian Institute for Health Information
(CIHI) reporting the supply of physicians across provinces over time according to whether
they are general practitioners or specialists. We use these data to evaluate whether ﬂuc-
tuations in the composition of the physician workforce had an impact on the health status
of Canadians over the period 1994 to 2000. Using these data enables us to study a broad
spectrum of the Canadian population, and not limit ourselves to individuals presenting a
speciﬁc health condition. We also simultaneously control for risk factors at the individual
level, e.g. smoking behaviour, education, drinking behaviour, age, income, etc.
Due to the small numbers of individuals diagnosed with some health conditions in the
survey, we are not able to study how physician supply aﬀects diﬀerently individuals with
speciﬁc health problems. We do not diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent chronic conditions
and therefore assume all physicians of diﬀerent specialties have a similar impact on the
health of individuals with diﬀerent health problems. Moreover, in remote areas, a specialist
1might discuss the case of one of his patients with a colleague e.g.: a specialist from another
discipline. Although this could also take place in urban areas where physician supply is
higher, we think it would be less likely to occur. Moreover, it would be diﬃcult to “limit”
the types of doctors (specialties) that could have an eﬀect on the health of an individual
given their chronic condition. We test and control for endogeneity of supply, as provinces
in which individuals display especially bad health statuses might have policies that would
attract more physicians, and control for it in our model.
We estimate a Grossman-type model (Grossman, 1972), in which present health status
is both a function of physician supply in the province and past health (in some of the
regressions). We are not able to study how the distribution of physicians within a province
aﬀects health status. For example, if some provinces have policies which are more eﬀective
when trying to entice physicians to practice in remote areas, we cannot control for it. We can
control for the fact that an individual lives in a remote area, and, therefore, partly control
for the risks and beneﬁts inherent in living in such a setting.
We need to use diﬀerent econometric techniques to study the impact of physician supply
on self-rated health status, which is an ordered categorical variable, and on the Health Utility
Index (HUI), which is a continuous, but limited, variable. Random eﬀects ordered probits
are used with the former while quantile regressions evaluated at the 10th , 20th and 30th
percentiles of the distribution are used for the HUI. These dependent variables measure
quality of life, more than length of life, the dimension of health about which Canadians seem
to be most concerned. We limit the time lag of the impact of physician supply to two years,
as physicians’ services are more likely to have short-term eﬀects on health status, compared
to expenditures on capital for example (e.g. an MRI machine). The variables used to control
for past health status also help control for the eﬀect of past services rendered by physicians.
We present a brief survey of the relevant literature in section 2. A description of the data
sources, the model and the estimation techniques used follows in section 3. We describe the
results obtained in the fourth section and discuss their implications as well as problems that
could be present in the data and in our estimation methods before concluding remarks.
22 Literature Review
2.1 Previous studies
A comprehensive review of studies in the ﬁeld was done. All studies used American data
and therefore, the results are hard to apply to the Canadian case.
Escarce (1992) found that the supply of surgeons in a region is positively correlated with
the demand for ﬁrst-contact appointments but not with the number of surgeries, contradict-
ing earlier studies (e.g. Pasley et al. (1987), cited in Escarce). A study by Roetzheim et al.
(2000) found that a higher dermatologist and family physician supply (per capita and per zip
code) is associated with earlier diagnosis of melanomas in Florida in 1994. A higher supply
of general practitioners, obstetrician/gynecologists and other non-primary care specialists,
however, did not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact. In another study, Roetzheim et
al. (1999) found that a higher supply of primary care physicians and of general internists
decreased the odds of a late stage diagnosis of colorectal cancer, but the opposite was ob-
served for a higher supply of specialists in the region. They did not ﬁnd any relationship
between overall physician supply and the stage at diagnosis. Similar results were obtained
by Ferrante et al. (2000) concerning early detection of breast cancer using the same data.
Last, Krishan et al. (1985) study the impact of a higher physician supply on the use of
health services in rural Minnesota over a ﬁve year period using t-tests and ﬁnd a positive
correlation. The authors evaluate the changes in the use of physician services following the
establishment of a Mayo clinic health facility in the area, which staﬀed two physicians (an
additional physician was added to the manpower in the studied area). Although an increase
in the number of physician visits was observed, the larger part of this increase came from
visits to an established physician rather than visits to the new practitioner.
There are also a number of studies that look at the eﬀect of being treated by a specialist
instead of a generalist for some acute health problems. In a study by Nash et al. (1997),
treatment by a cardiologist, rather than by an internist or family practitioner, was shown
to lower the risk of mortality for patients with an acute myocardial infarction, as well as
to shorten the length of the patient’s hospital stay. In a similar study of Medicare patients
3(individuals over 65 years old) with acute myocardial infarction, Jollis et al. (1996) studied
the impact of admission by a cardiologist on the one-year survival rate of the patients.
They found that patients who were admitted by a cardiologist were 12% less likely to die
within the following twelve months than were patients who had been admitted by a primary
care physician. There were diﬀerences between the categories of patients admitted by a
cardiologist and the ones admitted by a primary care practitioner: the cardiologists’ patients
were on average two years younger and less likely to be women. Compared to patients
admitted by cardiologists, the ones admitted by primary care physicians had lower predicted
30-day mortality. The results showed care by a cardiologist to be associated with the use
of more resources in the course of treatment of these patients. Greenﬁeld et al. (1995),
using an ANOVA model to study outcomes of patients with hypertension and non-insulin-
dependent diabetes mellitus, found no diﬀerences in outcomes of patients at the two-year
and four-year follow-ups, except for patients with non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus
with foot ulcer and infection, who seemed to have better outcomes when followed by an
endocrinologist. No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mortality at the seven-years follow-
up were observed with respect to physician specialties. Drummond et al (1990) studied the
diﬀerence in treatments by generalists and specialists of problem drinkers using results from
a randomized controlled trial of 40 individuals. No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
outcomes of the two groups was found.
Last, Ayanian et al (1997) studied the diﬀerence in treatment and outcomes, measured
as mortality at a 30 day and a one year follow-ups, of being treated by a cardiologist versus
a generalist physician for Medicare patients admitted to a hospital with acute myocardial
infarction in Texas. Cardiologists were more likely to use coronary angiography and angio-
plasty than generalist but 1-year mortality rates between the two groups of patients were
similar. The authors conﬁrm that one of the limitations of this study is that it is not a
randomized controlled trial, but an observational study. This limitation also applies to most
studies reviewed here, as well as to ours.
42.2 Limitations of the methods used in the literature
Previous studies have used data from the United States where many individuals, other than
seniors or the poor, must pay for physician and hospital services out of pocket or through
a private insurance plan. Hence, access to a physician might be constrained not just by the
supply of physicians in the area, but also by the individual’s income. Furthermore, Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) may restrain access to care of their members to keep
costs down, e.g., by hiring fewer specialists. Roetzheim et al. (2000) estimated their model
separately for individuals who were covered by an HMO and for other types of insurance
coverage. However, they state their sample sizes were too small to reach strong conclusions
regarding the eﬀect of the diﬀerent insurance plans on the access to services of patients.
Hence, it was diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀect of physician supply per se on health outcomes.
The universal nature of the public health insurance system in Canada should make it easier
to estimate this supply eﬀect.
Most previous studies have not been able to control for socioeconomic status at the level
of the individual or family. Instead, they typically used the average of the variables over a
geographic unit, e.g., the average level of education in the county. The actual socioeconomic
status of the individual is clearly preferred not only to improve estimation precision.
Some studies report that it was diﬃcult to distinguish between the physician that admit-
ted the patient to the hospital and the physician who was responsible for treatment decisions.
For example, the patient may have been admitted by a primary care physician, but a spe-
cialist may have made most decisions with respect to diagnosis and treatment. Some of the
studies that we reviewed report that there might have been errors in some cases. As we
look at the eﬀect of physician supply in a province on the health of individuals in general,
regardless of where the obtained health care and whether it was from a general practitioner
or a specialist, these problems do not apply to our study.
Lastly, most of these studies, unlike this paper, did not use measures of the individual’s
overall health status, but rather measures of the speciﬁc outcomes (mortality rates, compli-
cations, stage at diagnosis, etc.) following an acute health problem (myocardial infarction,
cancer, etc.). Moreover, none of these studies measured the impact of physician supply on
5the health of individuals that were in relatively good health, i.e., were not diagnosed with a




3.1.1 The NPHS Data
We use data from the National Population Health Survey (NPHS) as well as data from the
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI). The data available from CIHI provides
the number of doctors who worked in each of the ten provinces by specialty from 1980 to
2000.
The NPHS is a survey of approximately 15000 households conducted in Canada by Sta-
tistics Canada. The ﬁrst cycle was in 1994-1995 and three subsequent waves of interviews
have been used, every other year up to 2000-2001. Limited information was collected from
all household members. One individual aged 12 and over was randomly selected in the
household to answer questions about her or his health status, health problems and use of
services provided by the health care sector (www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/3225.htm). The
households were chosen from a sample drawn for the Labour Force Survey in all provinces
but Quebec, for which the sample was drawn from the Enquˆ ete sociale de la sant´ e, conducted
in 1992-1993. The sample covers all 10 provinces but excludes the population residing on
Indian Reserves, Canadian Forces Bases and in some remote areas in Quebec and Ontario.
The data enables one to control for inter-provincial migration after the start of the survey but
not before. One is able to control for international migration prior to the start of the survey,
in that the data indicate when an individual moved to Canada and from which country.
The NPHS data enable one to control at the individual level for lifestyle factors, such
6as smoking and drinking, as well as socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as
education, income, marital status, etc. Moreover, the NPHS covers the post-1994 period
during which the cutbacks in federal transfers for health care occurred. The NPHS is a
panel, which enables us to observe the individuals’ trajectories and changes in health status
from the beginning of the federal transfer cutbacks in 1994 up through 2001.
The two principal measures of overall health that we use are the self-assessed health status
variable and the Health Utility Index (HUI). Self-assessed health status (excellent, very good,
good, fair or poor) is subjective since two individuals may rate the same objective health
status diﬀerently. The literature shows, however, that self-assessed health status is highly
correlated with other measures of health status (Gerdtham et al., 1999, cited in Crossley
et al., 2002). The HUI diﬀers from the self-assessed health status measure in several ways.
First the HUI is based on reports of attributes such as vision, speech and hearing which may
not be taken into account in the self-assessed health variable. Second, the HUI explicitly
incorporates inter-personal utility comparisons. Our analysis of the data shows that these
two measures of health status tend to measure health status according to diﬀerent criteria.
For example, an individual who needs glasses to recognize somebody on the other side of
the street would not have a HUI score of perfect health (1.0) but could rate her own health
as excellent. We think both of these measures have merits and use them both. The NPHS
is, as far as we know, the best source of Canadian data for these types of health outcome
measures.
We also use the available information on chronic conditions. What is of particular use is
any observed changes in chronic conditions between waves of the NPHS that could be used
to signal an improvement or deterioration in health status.
There are often only a small number of individuals diagnosed with a speciﬁc chronic
condition in the survey. Hence, we merge together groups of individuals who have diﬀerent
chronic conditions and who use services from diﬀerent specialists. This empirical strategy
assumes that the eﬀect of specialist x on the health status of an individual with chronic
condition a is the same as the eﬀect of specialist y on the health status of an individual with
chronic condition b. The impact of such aggregation is unclear. We control for the supply
of specialists in the model, regardless of their specialty. The reason for this being that while
7an individual goes to a specialist relevant to his health problem, this specialist might discuss
the case with a specialist from another discipline, either connected to the case at hand, or
not (for example if the physician practices in a region where there is a relatively low supply
of physicians). This assumption also simpliﬁes the analysis.
Endogeneity between the number and type of physicians and health status of the individ-
uals in a province is theoretically possible. Physicians may go to the provinces where there is
the highest need for their services, e.g., psychiatrists could decide to move to the provinces
with the highest number of psychiatric patients. However, public policy so far has been
geared towards enticing physicians to choose to practice in areas where there are relatively
few physicians per capita, not where there are relatively many health problems per capita.
Furthermore, these public policies have focused on intra-provincial physician migration and
not inter-provincial migration. We test for potential endogeneity using the Smith-Blundell
test of exogeneity for probit regressions.
Our sample includes all individuals who were at least 18 years old at the time of the ﬁrst
interview and who did not die, were not institutionalized and were still part of the sample
at the end of the period (2000). It includes all individuals who answered to the health
questionnaire of the NPHS. Characteristics of the sample are shown in Table A-1-A.
The CIHI data only report the number of generalists and specialists per province. Hence,
we are not able to control for diﬀerences in access within a province, but only for diﬀerences
in access between provinces. We are able to control for whether the individuals reside in an
urban or rural area, a factor that could have an eﬀect on both health status and on access
to health services provided by physicians.
We can look at the progression of per capita physician supply over the same period in
Figures 1 and 2. Trends in the supply of general practitioners are shown in ﬁgure 1, while
the evolution of the supply of specialists is displayed in Figure 2.
83.2 Model and estimation strategy
3.2.1 The Grossman model
The Grossman model (1972) is the best-known model in the health production literature.
It supposes that an individual maximizes her inter-temporal utility function subject to the
fact that if her health stock (or health status) falls below a certain level, she will die. The
individual can either invest in her health status or in the composite good. The maximization
problem is such that for the ith period:
U = U(φ0H0,···,φnHn,Z0,···,Zn), the utility function (3.2.1)
Hi+1 − Hi = Ii − δiHi, the health accumulation equation (3.2.2)
Ii = Ii(Mi,THi;Ei), the investment in health equation(3.2.3)
Zi = Zi(Xi,i ;Ei), the investment in the composite good equation (3.2.4)
Subject to TWi + TLi + THi + Ti = Ω, the time constraint (3.2.5)
Where H0 is the inherited stock of health, Hi, is the stock of health in the ith period,
φiHi is the consumption of health services, Zi is the consumption of the composite good, Ii
is the investment in health, Mi is medical care, Ei is education, Xi is the input needed for
the production of the composite good, THi, is the time spent on health production (either
on preventive measures, such as exercising, or when getting health care), TLi is the time
lost due to illness, TWi is time worked, Ti, is the time spent on producing Zi (and leisure).
We use a variation of the Grossman model to estimate how health care services, through
physician supply, have an eﬀect on health status: Mi has an eﬀect on Ii which itself impacts
on Hi. This analysis supposes that physician supply has an eﬀect on access to physician
services.
To test that this model applies, we tried to establish, using ﬁxed eﬀects negative binomial
regressions and ﬁxed eﬀects logits respectively, if there was a relationship between physician
supply per capita and the number of times (number of consultations) the individual saw a
general practitioner, a specialist, and on whether he had a regular physician. As we can see
in Table A-2, physician supply has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on whether an individual
9has access to physician services. The number of specialists per capita has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the number of visits to a specialist during the previous year. The number of general
practitioners also has a positive statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on health status. We also
use the supply of specialists and general practitioners per capita as regressors in a ﬁxed
eﬀects logit regression to establish if physician supply has an eﬀect on the likelihood of an
individual to have a regular physician. We ﬁnd that a higher per capita specialist supply has
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in this regression but that the supply of general
practitioners has no statistically signiﬁcant impact.
We estimate a simpliﬁed version of the Grossman model in our research to estimate what
is the impact of physician supply, through Mi, on health status, Hi.
3.2.2 The model
The NPHS is a panel, which will enable us to estimate both ﬁxed eﬀects models and random
eﬀects models. Consider the following speciﬁcation for the determinants of health status of
the ith individual in the tth time period.
Yit = αi + Xitβ + uit. (1)
The random eﬀects speciﬁcation assumes that unobserved αi is not correlated with the
observed Xit (explanatory variables).
In our model,
Yit = αi + Xitβ + MDitγ + uit. (2)
where the Xit variables control for socioeconomic and demographic eﬀects (age, gender,
education, income, etc.) which are well known health determinants. The physicians’ vari-
ables will measure the supply of physicians, both specialists and general practitioners. The
10MDit variable controls for the number of specialists and the number of general practitioners.
As the eﬀect physicians’ visits might have on health are much more ”short term” than the
supply of other services might be (e.g. by comparison, expenditures on an MRI might still
have an eﬀect on the health of patients in a province numerous years after the expenditure
occurred), we limit this length of time to two years. Therefore, in our model, the supply of
physicians today will have an eﬀect on the health of individuals two years from now, but not
afterwards.
We estimate ordered probit regressions (for ordered polychotomous, or categorical, depen-
dent variables) when using the self-assessed health status variable, and we estimate quantile
regressions when using the HUI.
We study how physician supply impacts on the likelihood of an individual to be diagnosed
with a chronic condition using ﬁxed eﬀects logit regressions. We also analyze separately those
individuals who do not have a chronic condition during any of the four waves and look at
whether the per capita number of generalists and specialists in the province has an impact
on their health status. Previous studies have looked at the eﬀect of physician supply on
early stage diagnosis of diﬀerent cancers and on mortality rates, but we were not able to
ﬁnd studies reporting on the eﬀect of physician supply on general health or on the likelihood
of recovery. In the case of chronic conditions, it also is important to control for the total
number of doctors (per capita) in the province. A greater density of physicians per se may
lead to improved care for chronic conditions via better sharing of information and professional
training.
The eﬀect of an increased supply of physicians on chronic conditions may be twofold.
A large supply of physicians could mean not only better access to health care treatment
but also more accurate and timely diagnosis of chronic conditions. The NPHS questionnaire
speciﬁes that a chronic condition reported by the individual should have been diagnosed by
a physician. We might therefore observe that provinces with more physicians have more
individuals with chronic conditions due to better access to diagnostic services. Hence, par-
ticular care will have to be taken in making inferences from our analysis of the coeﬃcients
related to the dummy controlling for the presence of chronic conditions.
We control for gender, the default is male, and whether the individual is an immigrant
11(Marmot, 1975 and Marmot and Syme, 1976). We also control for age, through dummy
variables, for age 40 to 59, age 60 to 79 and 80 years old and over, in the random eﬀects
ordered probits and the quantile regressions, the default is being between the ages of 18
and 39. We expect the individuals to have reported their health status as compared to
other individuals who are the same age and expect older individuals to display worse health
status as measured by the health utility index and self-assessed health status variables (the
distribution of both variables by age categories shows older individuals tend to report worse
health status). We control for the marital status of individuals, the default is being single,
as well as use interaction terms between gender and marital status. We control for whether
the individual lives in a rural area: this could control for better access to health care services
of individuals who live in an urban area or for worse environment when living in either an
urban area (e.g. exposure to lead, Hertzman, 1994), or a rural one (exposure to pesticides,
water quality, etc.). We also control for the logarithm of the size of the household, as a proxy
for social interaction (Stoddart, 1995 and McEwen, 1998) which are shown in the literature
to be negatively associated with mortality rates and to control for per capita income in the
household.
We control for whether the individual owns his dwelling, which might capture a wealth
eﬀect. We control for income, using dummies for less than $20000, $40000 to $59999, $60000
to $79999 and over $80000 a year, the default being an income between $20000 and $39999
per year. We expect higher categories of income to lead to better health status but this
income-health relationship goes both ways. Individuals who are in better health are more
likely to work full time and to be able to keep their jobs and are, therefore, more likely to
earn higher levels of income. We control for education (Hertzman, 1994) using dummies
for less than high school, some post-secondary education and an undergraduate degree or
better, the default being high school graduation, in the random eﬀects ordered probits and
the quantile regressions. We also control for whether the individual is a smoker and whether
he binge drinks (deﬁned as having ﬁve drinks or more on one occasion on a monthly basis or
more frequently). We also control for the province in which the individual lives, the default
being Ontario. Lastly, we control for health status in the preceding period, using dummies
controlling for the diﬀerent levels of self-assessed health in the previous period (the default
being very good health ) for random eﬀects ordered probits, and the HUI in the preceding
period for quantile regressions
124 Results
4.1 Test of Endogeneity
We used diﬀerent measures of health status: we dichotomized the self-rated variables into
its 5 corresponding dummies (excellent, very good, good, fair and poor health) and created
merged categories of health statuses (such as excellent or very good health which was coded
as 1 if the individual reported either excellent or very good health in a given cycle). As
the Smith-Blundell1 tests rejected exogeneity at least some of the time, particularly when
using excellent health, poor health and excellent or very good health merged together as
the dependent variables, we decided to lag the eﬀect of physician supply by one period (two
years) and to use the average supply of physician during the two year before the survey.
For example, when looking at the health of an individual in cycle 1 (1994-1995) we control
for the average supply of specialists and generalists in 1992 and 1993. Although physician
supply two years ago can still have an eﬀect on health status today, the reverse is not true.
The variables controlling for past supply of physicians, both generalists and specialists, are
highly correlated and we therefore think that past supply of physicians is a good indicator
of present supply of physicians. Moreover, adding the lagged health variable contributes
to lessen the potential for endogeneity: lagged health is an instrument of the eﬀect of past
physician supply on health status. As present health might determine present physician
demand (and supply), past health can do the same for past physician demand and supply,
while present health can be determined by past health but the opposite eﬀect does not exist.
In most regressions, we observe the expected signs for the health determinants for which
we control. Smoking and binge drinking are correlated with worse health outcomes when
statistically signiﬁcant. Education has the expected sign; less than a high school degree
is correlated with worse reported health and having a bachelor degree is correlated with
better health outcomes. When an individual owns his dwelling, he usually reports better
1The Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity works in a similar manner to the Hausman test and is used
for dichotomous dependent variables. One must use instrumental variables for the potentially endogenous
variables, in our case lags up to 10 years of general practitioners supply per capita and of specialists per
capita.
13health status. Income has the expected sign (higher income is correlated with better health
outcomes). Being married or widowed is usually correlated with better health outcomes
for women, while the eﬀects are not as consistent for men. Being older is correlated with
worse health outcomes for both genders. Being an immigrant, when statistically signiﬁcant,
is correlated with worse health outcomes. To save space, we have not reported all of the
coeﬃcients in the main tables, but sample of the coeﬃcients obtained can be seen in table
A-3.
4.2 Random Eﬀects ordered probits
As we can see in table 1, the number of specialists per capita has a negative eﬀect on self-
reported health while the number of per capita general practitioners has a positive eﬀect,
with coeﬃcients of -0.74 and 0.49 respectively. These coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 and 5% level of conﬁdence respectively2. The interaction terms between having a
chronic condition and the number of specialists and generalists do not have a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect here but the interaction term between the supply of general practitioners
and being between the ages of 60 and 79 has a positive eﬀect, with a coeﬃcient of 0.72
signiﬁcant at the 1% level of conﬁdence, while the interaction term between the supply of
specialists and being between the ages of 40 and 59 has a smaller, in terms of absolute
value, eﬀect, with a coeﬃcient of -0.22 signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Living in any province
other than Quebec has a signiﬁcant eﬀect at the 1% level of conﬁdence on health status in
this regression, compared to living in Ontario, with coeﬃcients ranging between -0.14 (Nova
Scotia) and -0.43 (Saskatchewan). All four dummies controlling for lagged health status have
a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on present health and the coeﬃcients are higher and positive
for better health statuses (0.60 for excellent health) and negative and progressively bigger for
worse health statuses (-0.51 for good health, -1.21 for fair health and -1.98 for poor health).
2Note that the results for the random eﬀects ordered probits could not be bootstrapped using the method
by Yeo, 1999. The command in Stata does not support weights and the models are too computationally
intensive to make using the 500 replications of bootstraps suggested impossible in practice. In regressions
where bootstrap weights can be used, such as the quantile regressions, we observe that the standard errors
obtained in the bootstrapped regressions are consistently higher and that many of the variables that were
evaluated to have a statistically signiﬁcant impact in the non-bootstrapped regressions have no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant impact in their bootstrapped counterparts. Bootstrapped standard errors are larger than
standard-errors that allow for Moulton’s correction (Moulton, 1990)
14All of these health dummies are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of conﬁdence.
4.3 Quantile Regressions
In all three quantile regressions, in Table 2, controlling for lagged health status through
lagged HUI, the variables controlling for physician supply are statistically signiﬁcant: the
per capita supply of specialists in the province has a negative coeﬃcient varying between
-0.10 and -0.04, signiﬁcant at the 10% or 5% level of conﬁdence3. The per capita number of
general practitioners in the province is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of conﬁdence
when using any of the three percentiles and has a positive coeﬃcient varying between 0.06
and 0.32, signiﬁcant at the 1% level of conﬁdence. The dummies controlling for the presence
of a chronic condition have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in the quantile regressions and
the eﬀects are negative, varying between -0.05 and -0.15 and signiﬁcant at the 5% level
of conﬁdence or better, while none of the interaction terms involving this dummy have
a statistically signiﬁcant impact. The only interaction term between age categories and
physician supply that is statistically signiﬁcant is in the 20th percentile regressions: the
interaction term between being between the ages of 60 and 79 and the supply of specialists
in a province has a positive coeﬃcient of 0.05 statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level of
conﬁdence. The HUI in the previous period is statistically signiﬁcant in all three regressions
with coeﬃcients ranging from 0.78 to 0.93, all signiﬁcant at the 1% level of conﬁdence.
The few dummies controlling for the province of residence that are statistically signiﬁcant
in the regressions (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and
British Columbia) all have negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at the 10% level
of conﬁdence or better.
One must note that these regressions are not panel regressions such as the random eﬀects
regressions presented earlier in the paper. Individuals who appear in all four waves are
treated here as four diﬀerent observations. The software used did not enable us to count
them as one person or as ”clusters” of observations which might have things in common.
3Note that the standard errors are bootstrapped using the method recommended by Yeo, 1999 and the
program bswreg written by Pierard, Buckley and Chowhan (2004)
154.4 Sub-Sample: Individuals who do not report a chronic condi-
tion
We were not able to reject the exogeneity of the physician supply variables in the sample
including only individuals who do not have a chronic condition. However, we use the same
model as in the larger sample because we wanted to enable comparison between the results.
Characteristics of our sub-sample are in table A-1-B.
Although we took care of only eliminating individuals who did not report a chronic
condition in the ﬁrst two cycles, we have a lot less individuals in our sub-sample than
just the total size of the sample minus the percentage of individuals who report having a
chronic condition in any given cycle. The reason for this is that some individuals go back
and forth between having a chronic condition and not reporting one. Although it may be
understandable for some conditions, such as cataracts, this does not apply to all conditions for
which survey participants are asked about. To ensure that we would not include individuals
who may have been heavy users of the health care system, we’ve decided to not include
anybody who reported a chronic condition to later retract themselves and this is why we use
such a small sample in our estimations.
4.4.1 Random Eﬀects ordered probits
Going back to table 1, all of the dummies controlling for the health status reported in the
previous period display comparable coeﬃcients to the ones obtained when using the larger
sample. However none of the physician-supply related variables have a statistically signiﬁcant
impact on self-reported health. The only dummies controlling for the province in which the
individuals are living in that are statistically signiﬁcant are New Brunswick, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan and British Columbia, again with negative eﬀect on reported health. These
dummies are here only statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% level.
164.4.2 Quantile Regressions
In table 3, for the 20th and 10th percentile regressions, the per capita supply of general
practitioners is associated with higher HUIs, with coeﬃcients of 0.11 and 0.20 respectively.
None of the coeﬃcients corresponding to the supply of specialists are statistically signiﬁcant
and none of the interaction terms are statistically signiﬁcant. The only dummies controlling
for the province of residence of the individuals that are signiﬁcant in both the 20th and
10th percentile regressions are the ones controlling for the fact that individuals are living
in Saskatchewan or in British Columbia: the coeﬃcients are negative but small (-0.03 and
-0.08 for Saskatchewan and -0.02 and -0.05 for British Columbia). Lagged health status
(the HUI in the preceding period) is the only variable that is statistically signiﬁcant in the
30th percentile regression: it has a coeﬃcient of 0.39, which is rather low. The value of
the coeﬃcient related to this variable is also low in the other regressions, compared to their
counterparts using the whole sample.
4.5 The likelihood of developing a chronic condition
We also ran regressions to study the eﬀect of physician supply on the likelihood of devel-
oping a chronic condition and having it diagnosed by a physician, using ﬁxed eﬀects logit
regressions. The results for physician related variables can be found in table 4. Variables
pertaining to physician supply and province have no eﬀect on the likelihood of having a
diagnosed chronic condition. Controlling for health status in the preceding period has no
eﬀect on the likelihood of developing a chronic condition either. Age, especially age squared,
has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of developing a chronic condition. As
one would expect, the eﬀect is higher for older individuals. Smoking is also positively related
to the likelihood of developing a chronic condition, with coeﬃcients varying between 0.18
and 0.28. A larger household lowers the likelihood of having a chronic condition, at 10%
level of statistical signiﬁcance.
175 Discussion
Overall, physician supply-related variables have more of an impact on the health of individu-
als in the larger sample (including individuals who have a chronic condition at the beginning
of the survey). This eﬀect tends to be negative when we look at the per capita supply of
specialists and positive in the case of per capita supply of general practitioners. This is
the case for both self-assessed health status (in the random eﬀects ordered probits) and the
Health Utility Index (in the quantile regressions). There is no constant eﬀect of the interac-
tion terms between age, having a diagnosed chronic condition and physician supply across
regressions. The results concerning the variables controlling for the supply of generalists and
specialists by themselves (not in interaction with age dummies or the dummy controlling
for the presence of a diagnosed chronic condition) conﬁrm what Rotzheim et al. (1999) and
Ferrante at al. (2000) had found.
When looking at the results obtained using the quantile regressions, we can see that
the eﬀects of physician-related variables seem to be more important for individuals in worse
health (the lower quantiles). The size of the coeﬃcient of the variable controlling for per
capita supply of specialists becomes larger (in absolute value) and remains negative. This
would mean that a higher supply of specialists per capita has a worse eﬀect (negative) on the
health status of these individuals, who are already in a bad state of health. However, the size
of the coeﬃcient of the variable controlling for the per capita supply of general practitioners
also becomes larger across quantiles and increases three-fold between the 20th percentile and
the 10th.
The positive eﬀect on health of a higher supply of general practitioners could come from
the fact that individuals who are able to see a physician every year for a physical (or have an
easy access to physician services when they have small health concerns) beneﬁt from these
interactions, and these eﬀects are measured by a higher general state of health. This eﬀect
is measured both by our objective measure (the HUI) and in the one which could be deemed
as less objective (self-assessed health).
The negative coeﬃcient associated to a higher supply of specialists might come from
18the fact that in provinces where more individuals experience health problems requiring the
attention and care of a specialist, a higher supply of physicians only means that more in-
dividuals get the appropriate care and diagnosis. In the case where these health problems
have no cure and for which treatment can only alleviate some of the symptoms, there would
likely not be an eﬀect of these treatments on health status. A higher supply of specialists
in a province might come from a higher demand for their services. Although these services
might be necessary, they might not have an impact on health status per se, as measured in
this study.
Another explanation for the negative coeﬃcient associated with the per capita supply of
specialists could be related to supplier-induced demand: the negative coeﬃcient associated
with a higher supply of specialists could mean that when a specialist faces too much com-
petition from colleagues, he might order more procedures, which could be harmful to health
status according to our results, to maintain their desired income.
Lagged health is across regressions the best predictor of present health status, among the
variables related to health. The coeﬃcients that correspond to the dummies controlling for
the diﬀerent levels of health status in the preceding period are all statistically signiﬁcant in
the random eﬀects ordered probits and they are among the variables which have the largest
eﬀect on health status. In the quantile regressions, the HUI in the preceding period is the
variable that displays the largest coeﬃcients. This shows that among the factors we control
for, the past stock of health is the best predictor of future health. Health care services (here
physician supply) do have an eﬀect on health status, both through physician supply and
through the eﬀect past health services had on past health status, according to Grossman’s
model.
Our methodology does not enable us to control for the number of health services provided
to the population by each physician (physician practice style), or how much physicians make
per service provided (the provincial fee schedule). We are not able to control for changes to
provincial fee schedules, but doubt these would have a large impact: if a province paid its
physician much more for the same services, new physicians would likely ﬂood this new market,
the same way physicians are currently leaving Canada to practice in the US where work
conditions are better and salaries are higher. Some might argue that physician practice style
19is inﬂuenced by the fee schedule: physicians might order more non-threatening procedures
(such as non-invasive tests) if they are paid high fees when they order such procedures. We
are not able to control for this factor, whether it would have a positive (from reassurance)
or negative (from the procedure) eﬀect on the health of individuals, in this work. We are
not able to control for diﬀerences in practice-style that might come from diﬀerences in the
education of physicians across provinces either. For example, some medical schools might
advocate for a more aggressive treatment for cancer than medical schools in other provinces,
and therefore, cancer patients in one province could fare better than their counterparts in
another province. If medical school students have a tendency to stay and practice in the
province where they did their medical training, we might observe diﬀerences in outcomes
of patients across provinces but we are not able to control for these potential diﬀerences in
physicians’ practice style directly.
We are however controlling for provincial ﬁxed eﬀects, using dummies for each province.
Although we did not observe a constant pattern across all regressions, we can see that
all dummies display negative coeﬃcients when statistically signiﬁcant. This would suggest
that patients in Ontario tend to do overall better than their counterparts in other provinces.
These dummies might capture the eﬀect of some variables we do not control for such as other
provincial programs (e.g. welfare, education, other measures of health care). They might
also help control indirectly for some of the factors we mentioned earlier (e.g. physician
practice style). on the health of an individual given a speciﬁc health problem.
We are able to study the impact of physician supply on the health status of individuals
who do not have a chronic condition. We observe that physician related variables have less
of an impact on the health of these individuals. In the random-eﬀects ordered probits, none
of the physician-related variables have a statistically signiﬁcant impact at the 5% level of
conﬁdence or better. However, in the quantile regressions, using the HUI as a dependent
variable, the supply of general practitioners has a positive eﬀect on health status in the
lower (10th and 20th) percentiles. The eﬀect of this variable in the 10th percentile regression
was smaller than when using the larger sample including individuals who have a diagnosed
chronic condition. This conﬁrms what intuition would suggest: people in worse health beneﬁt
more from a better access to health care than healthy people do.
20We also tried estimating the eﬀect of physician supply on the likelihood of having a
diagnosed chronic condition. We ﬁnd physician supply has no eﬀect on this variable. This
could mean that the eﬀect of physician supply on health status we see in other regressions
comes from the eﬀect treatment and services oﬀered have on health status, and not from the
eﬀect the diagnosis of health problem could have on health status.
Some of our results are also dependent on the model used. For example, when looking at
coeﬃcients of the variables of interest in our quantile regressions without a control for past
health, we note that all coeﬃcients have the opposite sign than in the regressions controlling
for lagged health status. This is not observed in random eﬀects regressions, where coeﬃ-
cients have the same sign whether we control for lagged health status or not. The size of the
coeﬃcients tends to be larger when not using past health status as a regressors in all cases.
We think the reason we observe this in the quantile regressions might be that when we are
controlling for lagged health status, we are seeing the eﬀect of physician supply, province of
origin, etc. on a change in health status rather than on health status itself. However, control-
ling for lagged health status enables us to lessen the potential for endogeneity. The results
for the quantile regressions not controlling for lagged health status can be seen in Appendix
A-5-A and A-5-B. Results of random eﬀects ordered probit regressions not controlling for
lagged health status can be found in tables A-4.
Last, we cannot control for the fact that there might be some double-counting of physi-
cians in the data. It might be possible for a physician, especially in the Maritimes as the
provinces are very close together, to practice in a province, cross a boarder and work more
hours in another province. Physicians can earn more income by working in both a hospital
setting and in another practice and billing two diﬀerent provincial governments. We hope
only a minority of physicians share their time between provinces and that the eﬀect is not
large in our study.
216 Conclusion
We examined the eﬀect physician supply could have on measures of health status of Canadi-
ans. Using data from the NPHS and CIHI, we performed random eﬀects ordered probits on
the self-assessed health variables and quantile regressions when using the HUI. To minimize
the eﬀect of the potential endogeneity, we lag the eﬀect of physician supply by one year
and hypothesize that the eﬀects lasts for two years. Our model assumes that the lagged
health status variable (deﬁned as the HUI in the preceding period in the quantile regressions
and as dummies controlling for excellent, good, fair and poor health in the regressions us-
ing self-assessed health) controls partly for services rendered by physicians in the preceding
periods.
Even after controlling for endogeneity through the lagging of the eﬀect of physician supply,
as some endogeneity might remain, we used two samples. We ﬁrst run regressions on the
sample of all individuals who were not lost over the period of the survey (either through death,
institutionalization or partial response to the questionnaire) and we repeat the analysis on
the sub-sample of individuals who were not diagnosed with a chronic condition before 1994 or
over the course of the survey. As some individuals might have developed symptoms needing
treatment prior to the diagnosis of a chronic health problem, and that these symptoms might
have required visits to a physician, we cannot be sure that all of the endogeneity was removed
by the lagging of the eﬀect of physician supply in the larger sample.
The per capita supply of general practitioners is associated with better health outcomes
in most regressions using the larger sample. A higher per capita supply of specialists is
associated with worse health outcomes in all regressions using the larger sample. When
using the reduced sample, only expenditures on general practitioners remain statistically
signiﬁcant in the quantile regressions. Although the HUI and self-assessed health measure
diﬀerent aspects of health status, our results were similar across estimation methods. We
do not observe an eﬀect of physician supply on the likelihood of having a diagnosed chronic
condition.
We simultaneously controlled for provincial characteristics in our estimations by using
22dummies for the province of residence over the course of the survey. Although none of the
dummies had consistent patterns over all estimations of the model, it seems that Ontarians
are on average better oﬀ than their counterparts living in some of the other provinces.
There are a number of potentially interesting avenues at the end of this work. We could
use dynamic modelling to explore how both past and present physician supply aﬀect health
status, both past and present. It might also be interesting to use a wider cross-section of
the population and to investigate how diﬀerent physician specialties have an eﬀect on the
health status of individuals living with various health problems. Adding data on hospital
beds occupancy to our data might also help shed light on some of these results.
4
4For all Tables: Standard errors are in parenthesis; * means statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence
level ** means statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level *** means statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% conﬁdence level In the random eﬀect ordered probits, the second column of stars represents group
signiﬁcance (same rating system)
23Figure 1: Number of GPs Per Capita
















































Figure 2: Number of Specialists Per Capita
























































24Table 1 Random eﬀects ordered probits
Whole Sample Small Sample
GPs per capita 0.490 ** *** 0.652
(0.250) (0.461)
Specialists per capita -0.735 *** *** -0.422
(0.200) (0.385)
Newfoundland -0.290 *** *** -0.199 ***
0.075 (0.152)
Prince Edward -0.275 *** *** -0.019 ***
Island (0.079) (0.166)
Nova Scotia -0.136 *** *** -0.088 ***
(0.039) (0.091)
New Brunswick -0.412 *** *** -0.270 ** ***
(0.067) (0.137)
Quebec 0.062 *** -0.012 ***
(0.041) (0.086)
Manitoba -0.164 *** *** -0.147 ** ***
(0.031) (0.069)
Saskatchewan -0.429 *** *** -0.354 ** ***
(0.070) (0.142)
Alberta -0.205 *** *** -0.124 ***
(0.041) (0.089)
British Columbia -0.214 *** *** -0.182 * ***
(0.048) (0.102)
GPs per capita 0.260 *** 0.337
x Age 40-60 years old (0.189) (0.381)
GPs per capita 0.715 *** *** -0.237
x Age 60-80 years old (0.220) (0.624)
GPs per capita -0.068 *** 0.313
x Age 80 + years old (0.396) (1.790)
Specialists per capita -0.222 ** *** -0.018
x Age 40-60 years old (0.107) (0.209)
Specialists per capita -0.194 *** 0.104
x Age 60-80 years old (0.124) (0.330)
Specialists per capita -0.363 *** -0.342
x Age 80 + years old (0.232) (1.194)
Chronic Condition -0.129
(0.143)
GPs per capita -0.185 **
x Chronic Condition (0.174)
Specialists per capita -0.160 **
x Chronic Condition (0.098)
Lagged Health 0.595 *** *** 0.731 *** ***
(Excellent) (0.025) (0.042)
Lagged Health -0.512 *** *** -0.406 *** ***
(Good) (0.023) (0.049)
Lagged Health -1.211 *** *** -0.940 *** ***
(Fair) (0.036) (0.126)
Lagged Health -1.981 *** *** -2.183 *** ***
(Poor) (0.062) (0.621)
Cut Point 1 -3.723 *** -3.249 *** ***
(0.264) (0.524)
Cut Point 2 -2.552 *** -2.085 ***
(0.262) (0.507)
Cut Point 3 -1.248 *** -0.704
(0.260) (0.504)





Quantile regressions - Whole sample
30th percentile 20th percentile 10th percentile
GPs per capita 0.064 *** 0.091 *** 0.317 ***
(0.019) (0.030) (0.072)
Specialists per capita -0.036 ** -0.062 ** -0.098 *
(0.016) (0.026) (0.057)
Newfoundland -0.014 ** -0.024 ** -0.059 ***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.022)
Prince Edward -0.002 -0.005 0.032
Island (0.006) (0.010) (0.022)
Nova Scotia -0.011 ** -0.018 ** -0.019
(0.005) (0.009) (0.019)
New Brunswick -0.008 ** -0.011 * -0.051 ***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.017)
Quebec -0.005 -0.002 -0.015
(0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
Manitoba -0.007 ** -0.012 ** -0.013
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Saskatchewan -0.016 *** -0.030 *** -0.036 *
(0.006) (0.010) (0.021)
Alberta -0.009 ** -0.015 *** -0.022 *
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
British Columbia -0.016 *** -0.025 *** -0.068 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.014)
GPs per capita -0.018 -0.014 -0.027
x Age 40-60 years old (0.014) (0.031) (0.073)
GPs per capita 0.045 0.041 0.100
x Age 60-80 years old (0.045) (0.050) (0.133)
GPs per capita -0.056 0.148 0.025
x Age 80 + years old (0.181) (0.199) (0.334)
Specialists per capita 0.003 0.001 -0.016
x Age 40-60 years old (0.007) (0.015) (0.034)
Specialists per capita 0.024 0.048 * -0.015
x Age 60-80 years old (0.022) (0.027) (0.064)
Specialists per capita -0.191 -0.091 0.060
x Age 80 + years old (0.128) (0.108) (0.177)
Chronic Condition -0.046 ** -0.072 *** -0.154 **
(0.018) (0.028) (0.072)
Specialists per capita -0.001 -0.016 0.053
x Chronic Condition (0.011) (0.017) (0.042)
GPs per capita 0.028 0.041 0.032
x Chronic Condition (0.020) (0.032) (0.087)
Lagged HUI 0.778 *** 0.861 *** 0.935 ***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
Constant 0.186 *** 0.085 ** -0.205 **
(0.027) (0.038) (0.083)
27Table 3
Quantile regressions - Individuals without a chronic condition
30th percentile 20th percentile 10th percentile
GPs per capita 0.030 0.113 ** 0.203 **
(0.034) (0.055) (0.097)
Specialists per capita -0.028 -0.068 -0.120
(0.024) (0.044) (0.087)
Newfoundland -0.004 -0.024 -0.067 **
(0.009) (0.017) (0.030)
Prince Edward -0.006 -0.006 -0.020
Island (0.011) (0.020) (0.039)
Nova Scotia -0.006 -0.015 -0.027
(0.008) (0.015) (0.027)
New Brunswick -0.003 -0.022 ** -0.023
(0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Quebec 0.001 -0.006 -0.010
(0.006) (0.010) (0.019)
Manitoba -0.003 -0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.013)
Saskatchewan -0.017 -0.037 ** -0.083 **
(0.011) (0.017) (0.035)
Alberta -0.004 -0.010 -0.016
(0.006) (0.011) (0.021)
British Columbia -0.005 -0.024 ** -0.046 **
(0.006) (0.011) (0.019)
GPs per capita -0.016 0.016 0.070
x Age 40-60 years old (0.026) (0.052) (0.093)
GPs per capita 0.061 0.018 -0.032
x Age 60-80 years old (0.087) (0.123) (0.263)
GPs per capita -0.054 -0.263 0.635
x Age 80 + years old (0.394) (0.499) (0.602)
Specialists per capita 0.008 0.023 -0.004
x Age 40-60 years old (0.014) (0.028) (0.054)
Specialists per capita -0.050 0.000 0.054
x Age 60-80 years old (0.045) (0.067) (0.107)
Specialists per capita 0.048 0.164 0.116
x Age 80 + years old (0.215) (0.299) (0.324)
Lagged HUI 0.387 *** 0.475 *** 0.542 ***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.074)
Constant 0.590 *** 0.442 *** 0.305 **
(0.059) (0.074) (0.149)
28Table 4
Likelihood of having a diagnosed chronic condition
GPs per capita 1.129 0.684
(2.260) (3.400)




Prince Edward 0.062 -0.007
Island (0.619) (1.636)
Nova Scotia 0.226 -0.088
(0.832) (0.895)










British Columbia -0.011 0.080
(0.491) (0.931)
GPs per capita -0.039 -0.030
x Age (0.050) (0.073)
Specialists per capita 0.051 0.034









29Table A-1-A: Characteristics of the whole sample
Self-assessed Health Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Poor 151.96602 1.60 158.420 1.67 136.486 1.44 231.271 2.43
Fair 691.40839 7.27 676.632 7.12 710.311 7.47 931.634 9.80
Good 2,485.59 26.14 2576.481 27.10 2567.058 27.00 2717.794 28.59
Very Good 3,635.63 38.24 3789.411 39.86 3804.180 40.02 3607.700 37.95
Excellent 2,542.41 26.74 2306.057 24.26 2287.965 24.07 2016.600 21.21
Total 9507 9507 9506 9505
Cycle 1 (s-dev) Cycle 2 (s-dev) Cycle 3 (s-dev) Cycle 4 (s-dev)
Mean HUI 0.875 0.2350 0.904 0.2099 0.892 0.2191 0.891 0.2301
Total 9444 9453 9457 9408
% with a chronic Condition 56.28 0.68 62.72 0.66 63.57 0.64 66.08 0.62
Total 9498 9501 9502 9498
% with a regular physician 86.48 0.446 86.93 0.501 86.94 0.446 88.36 0.414
Total 9506 9507 9506 9506
Age 42.93 15.662 44.91 15.667 46.88 15.635 48.97 15.661
Total 9507 9507 9507 9507
Education Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Less than High School 2185.312 22.99 2062.610 21.70 2021.590 21.27 1984.515 20.88
High School Grad 1572.809 16.54 1470.409 15.47 1412.613 14.86 1375.672 14.47
Some post-secondary 4264.985 44.86 4446.370 46.77 4435.642 46.66 4434.534 46.65
University/Coll Grad 1483.894 15.61 1527.612 16.07 1636.155 17.21 1710.280 17.99
Total 9507 9507 9507 9507
Income Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
0-19999 1628.311 17.03 1590.353 16.7 1332.909 13.97 1148.338 12.13
20k-39999 2451.120 25.63 2554.880 26.83 2385.286 24.99 1971.769 20.83
40k-59999 2473.005 25.86 2479.290 26.03 2113.051 22.14 1997.904 21.1
60k-79999 1266.373 13.24 1223.333 12.85 1503.210 15.75 1563.456 16.51
80k and over 1323.191 13.84 1137.144 11.94 1738.544 18.21 2138.533 22.58
Total 9507 9507 9507 9507
Household smokes Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 3504.198 36.87 3265.007 34.36 3019.503 31.78 2617.436 27.54
No 6000.802 63.13 6235.994 65.64 6480.497 68.22 6886.564 72.46
Total 9505 9501 9501 9506
Individual Smokes Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 3005.893 31.62 2857.267 30.07 2692.946 28.34 2396.752 25.22
No 6499.107 68.38 6643.733 69.93 6807.054 71.65 7107.248 74.78
Total 9505 9501 9501 9506
Individual Binge Drinks Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 1158.734 12.33 1477.950 15.61 1407.750 14.88 1227.613 12.97
No 8237.266 87.67 7989.050 84.39 8055.250 85.12 8240.387 87.03
Total 9396 9467 9464 9469
30Table A-1-B: Characteristics of the sample excluding individuals with a chronic condition
Self-assessed Health Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Poor or Fair 34.475 1.47 38.708 1.65 30.951 2.23 28.995 4.56
Good 401.542 17.12 394.995 16.84 356.130 19.84 251.373 21.67
Very Good 963.970 41.09 1012.903 43.18 822.839 42.53 655.452 42.15
Excellent 946.012 40.32 899.394 38.34 744.080 35.40 576.180 31.60
Total 2346 2346 1954 1512
Cycle 1 (s-dev) Cycle 2 (s-dev) Cycle 3 (s-dev) Cycle 4 (s-dev)
Mean HUI 0.9273 0.1448 0.9568 0.1046 0.9540 0.1062 0.9578 0.1245
Total 2336 2342 1950 1508
% with a regular physician 78.63 0.575 79.58 0.595 77.87 0.59 78.52 0.562
Total 2346 2346 1954 1513
Age 37.586 15.063 39.565 15.060 40.564 15.589 42.066 15.553
Total 2346 2346 1954 1513
Education Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Less than High School 451.427 19.24 421.649 17.97 323.233 16.54 233.998 15.47
High School Grad 450.066 19.18 421.912 17.98 335.901 17.19 255.832 16.91
Some post-secondary 1075.585 45.85 1118.629 47.68 933.334 47.77 732.527 48.42
University/Coll Grad 368.922 15.73 383.810 16.36 361.532 18.50 290.644 19.21
Total 2346 2346 1954 1513
Income Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
0-19999 328.123 13.99 293.976 12.53 182.759 9.35 110.295 7.29
20k-39999 557.677 23.77 591.030 25.19 449.696 23.01 276.890 18.3
40k-59999 717.586 30.59 685.450 29.22 489.502 25.05 343.570 22.71
60k-79999 331.791 14.14 330.433 14.09 352.234 18.03 298.676 19.7
80k and over 329.580 14.05 320.297 13.65 385.471 19.73 394.572 26.08
Total 2346 2346 1954 1513
Household smokes Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 927.308 39.53 859.267 36.66 689.648 35.31 461.952 30.53
No 1418.692 60.47 1484.733 63.34 1263.352 64.69 1051.048 69.47
Total 2346 2344 1953 1513
Individual Smokes Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 778.344 33.18 747.380 31.88 591.420 30.28 413.357 27.32
No 1567.656 66.82 1596.620 68.12 1361.580 69.72 1099.644 72.68
Total 2346 2344 1953 1513
Individual Binge Drinks Cycle 1 % Cycle 2 % Cycle 3 % Cycle 4 %
Yes 347.970 15.02 496.935 21.30 397.255 20.43 281.567 18.68
No 1968.030 84.98 1836.065 78.70 1546.746 79.57 1225.433 81.32
Total 2316 2333 1944 1507
31Table A-2
Number of Consultations and Physician Supply
Specialists GP Regular
Consultations Consultations Physician
GPs per capita 0.400 *** -0.786 ***
(0.099) (0.585)
Specialists per capita 1.319 *** 2.570
(0.173) (0.854)
Constant -2.530 *** 0.097
(0.192) (0.115)
32Table A-3











Lives in rural area 0.001
(0.001)
Own the dwelling 0.004 *
(0.002)
Log household size 0.000
(0.001)




Income 60-79999 0.005 **
(0.002)
































Random eﬀects ordered probits without lagged health status
Whole Sample Small Sample
Specialists per capita -1.014 *** -0.997 ** ***
(0.235) (0.400)
GPs per capita 0.557 * 1.457 ***
(0.309) (0.398)
Newfoundland -0.350 *** *** -0.522 *** ***
(0.092) (0.159)
Prince Edward -0.371 *** 0.019
Island (0.097) (0.181)
Nova Scotia -0.254 *** -0.160
(0.060) (0.119)
New Brunswick -0.628 *** -0.537 ***
(0.084) (0.160)
Quebec 0.120 ** 0.001
(0.055) (0.090)
Manitoba -0.221 *** -0.217 **
(0.055) (0.099)
Saskatchewan -0.636 *** -0.634 ***
(0.087) (0.163)
Alberta -0.282 *** -0.082
(0.058) (0.112)
British Columbia -0.308 *** -0.438 ***
(0.063) (0.108)
GPs per capita 0.332 * 0.226
x Age 40-60 years old (0.290) (0.470)
GPs per capita 0.923 *** -0.668
x Age 60-80 years old (0.350) (0.783)
GPs per capita 0.578 2.027
x Age 80 + years old (0.618) (2.419)
Specialists per capita -0.286 * 0.070
x Age 40-60 years old (0.171) (0.264)
Specialists per capita -0.260 0.359
x Age 60-80 years old (0.208) (0.437)
Specialists per capita -0.699 * 1.042
x Age 80 + years old (0.378) (1.543)
Chronic Condition -0.336 *
(0.198)
Specialists per capita -0.261 * *
x Chronic Condition (0.136)
GPs per capita -0.087
x Chronic Condition (0.240)
Cut Point 1 -4.574 *** -4.055 ***
(0.318) (0.511)
Cut Point 2 -3.236 *** -2.613 ***
(0.317) (0.493)
Cut Point 3 -1.715 *** -0.964 **
(0.316) (0.492)
Cut Point 4 -0.035 0.680
(0.316) (0.491)
rho 0.510 *** 0.438 ***
(0.007) (0.014)Table A-5-A
Quantile Regressions without control for Lagged Health (Whole Sample)
30th percentile 20th percentile 10th percentile
Specialists per capita 0.175 *** 0.241 *** 0.310 ***
(0.032) (0.047) (0.079)
GPs per capita -0.172 *** -0.193 *** -0.278 ***
(0.030) (0.047) (0.075)
Newfoundland 0.098 *** 0.141 *** 0.190 ***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
Prince Edward 0.060 *** 0.095 *** 0.129 ***
Island (0.013) (0.018) (0.029)
Nova Scotia 0.051 *** 0.088 *** 0.114 ***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.026)
New Brunswick 0.015 * 0.003 -0.022
(0.008) (0.016) (0.033)
Quebec 0.009 0.018 ** 0.028 *
(0.006) (0.009) (0.015)
Manitoba 0.005 0.014 0.014
(0.007) (0.010) (0.021)
Saskatchewan 0.059 *** 0.090 *** 0.122 ***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
Alberta 0.027 *** 0.046 *** 0.067 ***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.017)
British Columbia 0.028 *** 0.039 *** 0.060 ***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.019)
GPs per capita 0.002 -0.057 -0.039
x Age 40-60 years old (0.032) (0.054) (0.107)
GPs per capita 0.160 ** 0.176 * 0.332 *
x Age 60-80 years old (0.068) (0.103) (0.192)
GPs per capita -0.217 -0.363 0.004
x Age 80 + years old (0.383) (0.344) (0.458)
Specialists per capita -0.007 0.030 0.035
x Age 40-60 years old (0.018) (0.029) (0.050)
Specialists per capita 0.076 * 0.139 ** 0.205 **
x Age 60-80 years old (0.039) (0.060) (0.095)
Specialists per capita 0.010 -0.151 -0.434 *
x Age 80 + years old (0.207) (0.261) (0.258)
Chronic Condition -0.094 *** -0.176 *** -0.266 **
(0.031) 0.057 (0.110)
Specialists per capita 0.023 0.053 0.106
x Chronic Condition (0.021) (0.042) (0.067)
GPs per capita 0.021 0.039 -0.004
x Chronic Condition (0.036) (0.064) (0.126)
Constant 0.935 *** 0.856 *** 0.784 ***
(0.037) (0.053) (0.094)
35Table A-5-B
Quantile Regressions without control for Lagged Health (Small Sample)
30th percentile 20th percentile 10th percentile
Specialists per capita 0.193 *** 0.197 *** 0.391 ***
(0.049) (0.064) (0.142)
GPs per capita -0.212 *** -0.210 *** -0.339 ***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.106)
Newfoundland 0.087 *** 0.093 *** 0.167 ***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.045)
Prince Edward 0.049 ** 0.061 ** 0.124 **
Island (0.019) (0.027) (0.054)
Nova Scotia 0.057 *** 0.057 ** 0.114 **
(0.018) (0.024) (0.047)
New Brunswick 0.026 ** 0.032 *** 0.065 ***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020)
Quebec 0.011 0.005 0.016
(0.009) (0.011) (0.021)
Manitoba 0.006 0.015 * 0.041 *
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021)
Saskatchewan 0.057 *** 0.057 ** 0.087 *
(0.018) (0.023) (0.049)
Alberta 0.031 *** 0.032 ** 0.070 **
(0.010) (0.015) (0.028)
British Columbia 0.047 *** 0.046 *** 0.077 ***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.027)
GPs per capita 0.043 0.063 0.028
x Age 40-60 years old (0.042) (0.067) (0.127)
GPs per capita 0.200 ** 0.049 0.158
x Age 60-80 years old (0.089) (0.108) (0.219)
GPs per capita -0.148 0.093 0.784
x Age 80 + years old (0.405) (0.518) (0.591)
Specialists per capita -0.023 0.000 -0.065
x Age 40-60 years old (0.026) (0.040) (0.081)
Specialists per capita -0.039 -0.015 0.008
x Age 60-80 years old (0.047) (0.057) (0.099)
Specialists per capita 0.155 0.101 0.064
x Age 80 + years old (0.218) (0.322) (0.340)
Constant 0.954 *** 0.926 *** 0.791 ***
(0.053) (0.073) (0.157)
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